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“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small 
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his 
or her rights.”1 
 
 Small claims class actions sit at the epicenter of a policy struggle. Are they vehicles for 
deterring defendants’ unlawful conduct, as suggested above by Amchem?2 Or must courts, when 
determining whether to certify small claims class actions, prioritize other policy goals such as 
efficiency, fair payouts to class members, and defendants’ due process rights? 
 The Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard was born out of the latter three 
policy objectives. Heightened ascertainability mandates that, as a prerequisite to class 
certification, 1) a proposed class must be defined with reference to objective criteria, and 2) there 
must be a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative 
class members fall within the class definition.3 Although four circuits, including the Third 
Circuit, have adopted heightened ascertainability standards, five circuits have adopted weak 
ascertainability standards. Under a weak ascertainability standard, there is no administrative 
feasibility requirement: classes must only be defined with reference to objective criteria, and the 
court need not analyze the mechanism put forth by the named plaintiff to identify potential class 
members. Thus, a proposed class filing suit in a circuit with a weak ascertainability standard has 
a greater chance at certification. 
Following Amchem, which held that a district court may only certify proposed settlement-
only classes if they satisfy all of Rule 23’s requirements, district courts are required to conduct 
                                                 
1 Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) 
2 See Daniel Luks, Note, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit: Name That Class Member, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2359, 2364 (2014). 
3 Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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ascertainability inquiries for both litigation and settlement-only classes. But in both Prudential 
and Sullivan, the Third Circuit insulated settlement-only classes from Amchem.4 Instead, in the 
Third Circuit, district courts certifying settlement-only classes do not need to conduct a 
manageability inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3)(D) due to the fact that “the settlement class presents 
no management problems because the case will not be tried.”5 Greater flexibility for settlement-
only classes, the Prudential and Sullivan courts reasoned, would incentivize parties to settle, 
which would in turn achieve the important policy objectives of global peace and judicial 
economy. 
 Thus, as exemplified by the Third Circuit, courts often approve “settlement-only classes 
in cases that would most likely not pass muster as a litigated class action.”6 But the fate of 
settlement-only classes under the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard is less 
certain. Comcast is the first and only Third Circuit case to address ascertainability in the context 
of a settlement-only class.7 Citing to both Carrera and Sullivan, the Comcast court applied weak 
ascertainability to reverse the district court and hold that a settlement-only class comprised of 
current and former Comcast subscribers was in fact ascertainable.8 Administrative feasibility was 
“not implicated by this case,” the court found, “because the settlement agreement removes the 
need for a trial.”9 The court also reasoned that the manageability and due process concerns that 
often appear in the litigation context are not at issue in the settlement-only context.10 
                                                 
4 In re Prudential, 148 F.3d 283, 321 (3d Cir. 1998); Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 303 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
5 Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 335 (Scirica, J., concurring). 
6 Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1494, 1498 (2013). 
7 In re Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig., 656 F. App’x 8 (3d Cir. 2016). 
8 Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013); Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 335 (Scirica, J., concurring). 
9 Comcast, 656 F. App’x at 9. 
10 Id. 
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Comcast is one of many recent cases in which the Third Circuit has demonstrated a 
stronger willingness to apply weak ascertainability.11 Weak ascertainability would mean the 
certification of more settlement-only classes, and the certification of more settlement-only 
classes would mean that Prudential and Sullivan’s policy objectives of global peace and judicial 
economy would be more consistently upheld. Keeping the Third Circuit’s more-favorable 
attitude toward weak ascertainability in mind, this paper will provide strategies for counsel to 
employ before the Third Circuit to insulate settlement-only classes from heightened 
ascertainability and to give the class they are representing a greater chance at certification. 
 In Part I, I survey existing ascertainability law. I first outline the Third Circuit’s 
heightened ascertainability standard, tracking the development of the Third Circuit’s treatment of 
ascertainability from 2012’s Marcus decision to 2015’s Byrd decision. I then contrast the Third 
Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard with other circuits’ weak ascertainability standards, 
highlighting the Seventh Circuit’s Mullins decision that adopted weak ascertainability. I also 
discuss recent dissenting and concurring opinions that use Mullins as a guidepost to encourage 
adopting weak ascertainability in the Third Circuit. 
 In Part II, I analyze two Third Circuit cases, Prudential and Sullivan, that interpret 
Amchem in a way that grants settlement-only classes greater leniency and flexibility than 
litigation classes. I then analyze Comcast, and show how it draws upon Sullivan to reverse the 
district court’s determination that the proposed settlement-only class was not ascertainable. 
 In Part III, I sketch out two strategies for counsel use before the Third Circuit to advocate 
for weak ascertainability in the settlement-only context, capitalizing upon the court’s recent trend 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am., Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 448 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, 
J., concurring); Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, J., concurring); Carrera v. Bayer 
Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
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favoring weak ascertainability. The first strategy demonstrates how the Third Circuit can read 
administrative feasibility into Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability inquiries. The second strategy 
proposes that settlement agreements between the parties can serve as substitutes for 
ascertainability inquiries by mitigating key policy concerns. In undertaking these strategies, the 
Third Circuit would remove administrative feasibility from the settlement-only context, and 
continue to treat settlement-only classes with greater flexibility in alignment with Prudential and 
Sullivan’s policy objectives of global peace and judicial economy. 
 
 
I. Ascertainability in the Third Circuit 
a. The development of the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard 
In the Third Circuit, for a class to be ascertainable, 1) the class must be defined with 
reference to objective criteria, and 2) there must be a reliable and administratively feasible 
mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall within the class definition.12 
The following three cases—Marcus13, Carrera14, and Byrd15—demonstrate the evolution of the 
Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard between Marcus in 2012 and Byrd in 2015. 
In Marcus, the court established that ascertainability was, impliedly, part and parcel of 
Rule 23 inquiries.16 The court held that a proposed class of BMW owners whose cars were 
equipped with defendants’ faulty tires was not ascertainable because the defendants’ records 
were incomplete. Further, the only alternative method proposed by the named plaintiff to identify 
class members “would amount to no more than ascertaining by potential class members’ say so” 
                                                 
12 Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593–594 (3d Cir. 2012). 
13 Id. 
14 Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013). 
15 Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163. 
16 Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593–594. 
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via self-identifying affidavits.17 Thus, there was no administratively feasible mechanism for 
identifying class members. 
The Marcus court determined that searching a defendant’s records, if sufficiently 
comprehensive, would be an administratively feasible mechanism for identifying class members. 
But in Marcus, the defendants’ records were incomplete. Although the defendants’ records 
contained information about the BMW purchasers, they did not pinpoint with certainty which 
cars were equipped with the specific faulty tires: BMW’s cars were assembled by a third-party 
company in Germany, and information about that process was not included in BMW’s records.18 
The court further determined that if a defendant’s records could not identify class members, then 
the named plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a “reliable, administratively feasible 
alternative” for identifying class members.19 The court explicitly cautioned district courts against 
approving a mechanism that would “accept as true absent persons’ declarations that they are 
members of the class,” such as the self-identifying affidavits proposed by the named plaintiff in 
Marcus.20 If the named plaintiff were to rely on the defendants’ incomplete records and self-
identifying affidavits for identifying class members, the Marcus court reasoned, then the court 
would have to hold individualized “mini-trials” to ensure that each alleged class member actually 
fit within the class definition.21 Classes that require “mini trials” to identify putative class 
members are not administratively feasible.22 
 The Marcus court rationalized imposing a heightened ascertainability standard with three 
policy objectives. First, requiring an administratively feasible mechanism for easily identifying 
                                                 




21 Id. at 593. 
22 Id. 
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class members would eliminate “serious administrative burdens that are incongruous with the 
efficiencies expected of class actions.”23 Second, administrative feasibility would protect absent 
class members by “facilitating the ‘best notice practicable’” under Rule 23(c).24 Third, 
administrative feasibility would safeguard defendants’ due process rights by identifying who, 
exactly, would be bound by the court’s final judgment, and by allowing defendants to challenge 
the evidence before the court that purports to identify class members.25 
Two years after Marcus, Carrera applied the heightened ascertainability standard to a 
proposed class of purchasers of WeightSmart diet supplements.26 Notably, the defendant in 
Carrera did not possess any WeightSmart sales records because it only sold WeightSmart 
through third-party retailers. 27 The named plaintiff proposed two mechanisms for identifying 
class members in the absence of sales records. First, the named plaintiff proposed searching the 
third-party retailers’ records of online sales and sales made with customer loyalty cards.28 
Second, the named plaintiff proposed collecting affidavits from WeightSmart customers, 
screened by an outside firm.29 The court rejected both proposed mechanisms because the named 
plaintiff had “merely propose[d] a method of ascertaining a class without any evidentiary support 
that the method will be successful.”30 
 First, the court rejected the mechanism involving records of online sales and loyalty card 
purchases because it was not “a manageable process that does not require much, if any, factual 
inquiry.” 31 Instead, the proposed method named only one WeightSmart retailer that had a loyalty 
                                                 
23 Id. (quoting Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., 191 F.R.D. 441, 446 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). 
24 Id. (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, § 21.222 (4th ed. 2004)). 
25 Id. (citing Xavier v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2011)). 
26 Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013). 
27 Id. at 304. 
28 Id. at 308. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 306. 
31 Id. at 307–308 (quoting 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:3 (5th ed. 2011)). 
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card program, and the named plaintiff had provided “no evidence that a single purchaser of 
WeightSmart could be identified using records of customer membership cards or records of 
online sales,” as well as “no evidence that retailers even have records for the relevant period.”32 
Second, in rejecting the named plaintiff’s mechanism involving self-identifying 
affidavits, the court expanded upon two of the policy objectives it had highlighted in Marcus: 
specifically, defendants’ due process rights and the protection of unnamed class members. First, 
the court stated that, in order to ensure due process, “a defendant must be able to challenge class 
membership,” which a defendant would not be able to do based solely on self-identifying 
affidavits.33 Next, the court emphasized the need to protect unnamed class members not only to 
ensure adequate notice under Rule 23(c), as it noted in Marcus, but also because it was “unfair to 
absent class members if there is a significant likelihood their recovery will be diluted by 
fraudulent or inaccurate claims.”34 The court reasoned that class members who joined the class 
through fraudulent self-identifying affidavits would unfairly dilute the recovery paid out to 
legitimate class members.35 The court also determined that the named plaintiff’s proposal that an 
outside firm screen class members’ claims neither “show[ed] the affidavits would be reliable” 
nor “propose[ed] a model for screening claims that is specific to this case.”36 
 Two years later, in Byrd, the Third Circuit backtracked somewhat from Carrera and 
certified a proposed class despite the named plaintiff’s reliance on affidavits to identify class 
members. In Byrd, the named plaintiff leased a computer from the defendant and later discovered 
                                                 
32 Id. at 309. 
33 Id. It did not help that the named plaintiff in Carrera had difficulty remembering that he purchased WeightSmart 
as opposed to another one of the defendant’s products. This called into doubt the reliability of self-identifying 
affidavits for all class members. 
34 Id. at 309–310. 
35 Id. The Carrera court held this to be the case despite plaintiff’s argument that the defendant’s due process rights 
were protected by a maximum possible payout of $14 million, since the defendant’s records showed that it sold $14 
million worth of WeightSmart in Florida. 
36 Id. at 311. 
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pre-installed spyware that had been videotaping her and members of her household.37 To identify 
class members, who included both computer lessees and the members of their households who 
had been videotaped, the named plaintiff proposed cross-checking addresses of lessees in the 
defendant’s sales records with addresses provided by household members in affidavits.38 The 
court held that the class was ascertainable, distinguishing Byrd’s identification mechanism, 
which was administratively feasible, from Carrera’s, which was not. Although Carrera’s 
proposed class relied solely on affidavits without any “objective records to identify class 
members,” the Byrd court made clear that “Carrera does not suggest that no level of inquiry as 
to the identity of class members can ever be undertaken” because “[i]f that were the case, no 
Rule 23(b)(3) class could ever be certified.”39 
 
b. Contrasting heightened and weak ascertainability standards 
Ascertainability is currently subject to a circuit split. In addition to the Third Circuit, 
three other circuits have adopted heightened ascertainability standards: the First Circuit, the 
Fourth Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit.40 Five circuits have adopted weak ascertainability 
standards: the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit, and the 
Ninth Circuit.41 Under a weak ascertainability standard, the named plaintiff does not need to 
                                                 
37 Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 2015). 
38 Id. at 170. 
39 Id. at 170–171 (emphasis in original). 
40 See, e.g., Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A class is not ascertainable unless the 
class definition contains objective criteria that allow for class members to be identified in an administratively 
feasible way.”); In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Carrera, 727 F.3d at 306) (“The 
definition of the class must be ‘definite,’ that is, the standards must allow the class members to be ascertainable.”); 
EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 
593 (3d Cir. 2012)) (“A class cannot be certified unless a court can readily identify the class members.”). 
41 See, e.g., In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 862 F.3d 250, 264 (2d Cir. 2017) (“The ascertainability doctrine that governs 
in this Circuit requires only that a class be defined using objective criteria.”); Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 
F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We . . . declin[e] to adopt an administrative feasibility requirement.”); Sandusky 
Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[T]his court has not addressed 
ascertainability as a separate preliminary requirement.”); Rikos v. P&G, 799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015) (“We see 
 9 
demonstrate a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for identifying potential class 
members. Instead, the named plaintiff must only define class membership with reference to 
objective criteria.42 Thus, in circuits with weak ascertainability standards, the court’s certification 
inquiry focuses only on the class definition provided by the named plaintiff, and not on how the 
named plaintiff intends to identify potential class members. 
The difference between heightened and weak ascertainability is best illustrated by 
comparing the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard with the Seventh Circuit’s 
weak ascertainability standard. The most recent case discussing ascertainability in the Third 
Circuit is City Select.43 In City Select, the Third Circuit applied heightened ascertainability to a 
proposed class of recipients of unsolicited fax advertisements from the defendant loan 
company.44 The named plaintiff’s proposed mechanism for identifying class members involved 
cross-checking self-identifying affidavits with the defendant’s customer database even though, as 
the defendant argued, the database was over-inclusive, containing thousands more customers 
than the fax recipients.45 The Third Circuit held that the named plaintiff’s identification 
mechanism nonetheless fulfilled heightened ascertainability. First, the plaintiff defined the class 
with reference to objective criteria—inclusion in the customer database—and not merely based 
on a proposed class member’s state of mind.46 Second, the named plaintiff’s mechanism for 
identifying class members was administratively feasible because “affidavits, in combination with 
                                                 
no reason to follow Carrera.”); Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Nothing in Rule 
23 mentions or implies this heightened requirement under Rule 23(b)(3).”). 
42 Compare Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 (“The ascertainability inquiry is two-fold.”) with Mullins, 796 F.3d at 662 (“The 
Third Circuit’s approach . . . goes much further than the established meaning of ascertainability and in our view 
misreads Rule 23.”). 
43 City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of North America, Inc., 867 F.3d 434 (3d Cir. 2017). 
44 Id. at 436. 
45 Id. at 441. 
46 Id. at 439 n.3 (citing 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:3 (5th ed. 2011)) (“Under the objective criteria 
requirement, ‘[a] class definition that depends on subjective criteria, such as class members’ state of mind, will fail 
for lack of definiteness.’”). 
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records or other reliable and administratively feasible means, can meet the ascertainability 
standard.”47 
 On the other hand, in Mullins, the Seventh Circuit’s seminal case imposing weak 
ascertainability, the named plaintiff had to jump through considerably fewer hoops to certify the 
proposed class. In Mullins, the court held that the proposed class—purchasers of a falsely-
advertised joint pain relief supplement—was defined with reference to objective criteria because 
the named plaintiff “defin[ed] the class in terms of conduct (an objective fact) rather than a state 
of mind.”48 The court then declined to adopt an administrative feasibility requirement because, in 
other circuits, administrative feasibility had “erect[ed] a nearly insurmountable hurdle at the 
class certification stage in situations where a class action is the only viable way to pursue valid 
but small individual claims.”49 Moreover, in establishing weak ascertainability, the Mullins court 
refuted the three policy objectives stressed by the Third Circuit in Marcus, Carrera, and Byrd: 
that heightened ascertainability encourages efficiency by reducing administrative burdens, 
prevents the dilution of payouts to unnamed class members, and protects the due process rights 
of defendants. 
First, the Mullins court determined that any concerns over excessive administrative 
burdens were sufficiently addressed by Rule 23(b)(3)(D)’s manageability requirement.50 Rule 
23(b)(3) requires the district court to “find[] that the questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”51 In conducting 
that inquiry, the district court must consider “the likely difficulties in managing a class action” 
                                                 
47 Id. at 441 (citing Byrd, 784 F.3d at 170–71). 
48 Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2015). 
49 Id. at 662. 
50 Id. at 663 (“This concern about administrative inconvenience is better addressed by the explicit requirements of 
Rule 23(b)(3).”). 
51 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
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under Rule 23(b)(3)(D).52 According to the Mullins court, identifying class members was part 
and parcel of any Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability inquiry; thus, “imposing a stringent version of 
ascertainability because of concerns about administrative inconvenience renders the 
manageability criterion of the superiority requirement superfluous.”53 
Second, the Mullins court found the risk of payout dilution due to fraudulent claims to be 
negligible: it could point to “no empirical evidence that the risk of dilution caused by inaccurate 
or fraudulent claims in the typical low-value consumer class action is significant.”54 Moreover, 
the court found unrealistic that a claimant would sign an affidavit under the penalty of perjury to 
recover, as was the case in Mullins, the $70 retail price of the supplement in question.55 
Third, the Mullins court pushed back at the Third Circuit’s characterization of 
defendants’ due process rights, emphasizing that defendants do not possess the right “to a cost-
effective procedure for challenging every individual claim to class membership,” as the Carrera 
court reasoned.56 Instead, defendants possess the narrower due process right to not “pay in excess 
of [their] liability and to present individualized defenses if those defenses affect [their] 
liability.”57 The Mullins court refused to ignore the “equally-important” policy objective of 
“deterring and punishing corporate wrongdoing,” and thus adopted weak ascertainability.58 
 
c. A push for weak ascertainability in the Third Circuit 
 Recently, three opinions—one dissenting and two concurring—by Third Circuit judges 
have encouraged walking back the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard. This 
                                                 
52 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 
53 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663. 
54 Id. at 667. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 669 (emphasis in original). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 668. 
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push against heightened ascertainability evolved gradually, beginning with an opinion written by 
Judge Ambro—notably, the author of the Marcus opinion that established the Third Circuit’s 
heightened ascertainability standard—dissenting to the Third Circuit’s denial of an en banc 
rehearing of Carrera.59 Judge Ambro stated that he “believe[s] . . . that Carrera goes too far” 
because proposed class members “should not be made to suffer” due to deficiencies in the 
defendant’s records.60 Judge Ambro further recognized that ascertainability, as a “creature of 
common law,” demands flexibility in its application, “especially in instances where the 
defendant’s actions cause the difficulty.”61 Although Judge Ambro, as Marcus’s author, believed 
that “the ability to identify class members is a set piece for Rule 23 to work,” he warned against 
as “rigid” an application of ascertainability as occurred in Carrera.62 
 Two years later, Judge Rendell, who joined Judge Ambro’s Carrera dissent, wrote a 
concurrence to Byrd that explicitly called for the Third Circuit “to do away with this newly 
created aspect of Rule 23.”63 Judge Rendell believed that by prioritizing the prevention of 
fraudulent claims, heightened ascertainability “has ignored an equally important policy objective 
of class actions: deterring and punishing corporate wrongdoing.”64 If Judge Rendell’s language 
sounds familiar, that is because it is: the Seventh Circuit used Judge Rendell’s concurrence as 
one of the guideposts of its Mullins opinion, stating that the court “agree[s] in essence with Judge 
Rendell’s concurring opinion in Byrd,” and citing to it five different times.65 
                                                 
59 Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
60 Id. at *3 (“When, as here, a defendant’s lack of records and business practices make it more difficult to ascertain 
the members of an otherwise objectively verifiable low-value class, the consumers who make up that class should 
not be made to suffer.”). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, J., concurring). 
64 Id. at 175. 
65 Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2015). Mullins also cited Judge Ambro’s Carrera dissent 
three times. 
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 Most recently, in his City Select concurrence, Judge Fuentes also called for “rejecting our 
added ascertainability requirement” and “requir[ing] only that a class be defined in reference to 
objective criteria.”66 Pushing back against Marcus’s policy concerns about fraudulent class 
members and defendants’ due process rights, Judge Fuentes argued that “they are already 
sufficiently protected by the existing requirements of Rule 23.”67 Judge Fuentes also borrowed 
verbatim language from Mullins to support the proposition that defendants do not have a due 
process right to the most “cost-effective” method for challenging individual claims to class 
membership.68 Throughout his concurrence, Judge Fuentes cited to Mullins eight times, and 
Judge Rendell’s concurrence six times, indicating his desire to point the Third Circuit in the 
direction of a weak ascertainability standard. 
 
II. Settlement-only classes in the Third Circuit 
a. From Amchem to Prudential and Sullivan 
 Class actions can be certified for settlement purposes only when parties successfully 
negotiate a settlement agreement, negating the need to go to trial. Although Rule 23(e)(2) 
requires that a district court finds a proposed settlement agreement to be “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate” before approving it, settlement-only classes nonetheless often face an easier path 
toward certification.69 According to Professor Frankel, “from class counsel’s perspective, a big 
advantage of the settlement-only action is that class certification is easier and settlement 
approval is more likely because the class is being certified purely for settlement.”70 
                                                 
66 City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am., Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 448 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J., 
concurring). 
67 Id. at 444. 
68 Id. at 447 (citing Mullins, 795 F.3d at 669) (emphasis in original). 
69 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). 
70 Richard Frankel, The Disappearing Opt-Out Right in Putative-Damages Class Actions, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 563, 
572 (2011). See also Howard M. Erichson, Class Actions and Access to Justice: The Problem of Settlement Class 
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This has rung true in the Third Circuit in particular, especially in Prudential and Sullivan, 
two decisions issued in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Amchem decision. Amchem held that 
settlement-only classes may not be certified unless they satisfy all of Rule 23’s certification 
requirements, just like litigation classes. But the Court also stated in dicta that settlement was 
“relevant to a class certification” when it came to manageability inquiries, and that when 
“confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire 
whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is 
that there be no trial.”71 
Embracing Amchem’s dicta, both Prudential and Sullivan worked around Amchem’s 
holding, determining that, in certain circumstances, settlement-only classes may be certified even 
if they would not be certified for trial. Prudential and Sullivan emphasized the policy objective 
of global peace, which, they note, is especially difficult to come by in “any large, multi-district 
class action.”72 Settlement-only classes, therefore, serve “the important policy interest of judicial 
economy by permitting parties to enter into comprehensive settlements that prevent relitigation 
of settled questions at the core of a class action.”73 To safeguard these policy objectives, the 
Sullivan and Prudential courts allowed settlement-only classes greater flexibility, even if there 
would be manageability issues if the matter were to go to trial. 
In Prudential, decided one year after Amchem, the Third Circuit affirmed the certification 
of a settlement-only class despite differences in the state laws that governed the class members’ 
claims. The court ultimately found that the Prudential class was manageable because the 
                                                 
Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 976 (2014) (“Recent cases have departed from Amchem, but unfortunately 
they have done so by adopting a more permissive stance toward settlement class actions.”). 
71 Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D)). 
72 Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 311 (3d Cir. 2011). 
73 In re Prudential, 148 F.3d 283, 308 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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“relatively minor differences in state law” among the class members’ claims could be overcome 
by trying claims governed by similar state laws together. 74 The court drew from Amchem’s dicta, 
determining that “after Amchem, the manageability inquiry in settlement-only classes may not be 
significant.”75 
The Sullivan court also declined to determine whether a settlement-only class was 
manageable.76 In Sullivan, only some members of a proposed class of diamond purchasers had 
standing to bring their claims due to variations in state antitrust laws.77 Drawing upon both 
Amchem and Prudential, the court determined that “the concern for manageability that is a 
central tenet in the certification of a litigation class is removed from the equation.”78 Thus, 
variations in state law, even where standing was concerned, were matters of manageability, and 
because “a settlement would eliminate the principal burden of establishing the elements of 
liability under disparate laws,” there was no need for a manageability inquiry in the settlement-
only context.79 In other words, at the certification stage for settlement-only classes, the district 
court need not conduct thorough inquiries into “the legal viability of asserted claims.”80 
 
b. Ascertainability inquiries and settlement-only classes 
 Because Amchem requires that settlement-only classes undergo the same certification 
analyses as litigation classes, district courts across the country now conduct ascertainability 
inquiries when considering the certification of proposed settlement-only classes. In circuits with 
                                                 
74 Id. at 316. 
75 Id. at 321. See also id. at 316 n.57 (“This [manageability] analysis, depending on the facts in each case, may no 
longer be necessary in the context of settlement-only class certification.”). 
76 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 
77 Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 273. 
78 Id. at 302–303. 
79 Id. at 303. 
80 Id. at 305. The court stated that this should instead be handled during the Motion to Dismiss stage. 
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heightened ascertainability standards, courts have held that settlement-only classes satisfy the 
administrative feasibility requirement when defendants produce records through which plaintiffs 
can identify prospective class members.81 For example, in Silvis, a case concerning artificially-
inflated utility prices, a court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that the 
defendant’s billing records “provide a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for 
identifying” individuals who subscribed to the defendant’s “specific energy program during 
specific periods of time.”82 In contrast, in circuits with weak ascertainability standards, courts 
have focused their inquiries on the objectivity of the class’s definition.83 For example, in Wright, 
a court in the Northern District of Illinois held that a proposed class of recipients of phone calls 
that violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act was ascertainable “because members 
belong to the class if they are on a list in [the defendant’s] records,” which meant that it was 
“possible to identify class members without any subjective criteria.”84 
In the only case in which the Third Circuit has considered the application of heightened 
ascertainability to a settlement-only class, Comcast reversed a district court’s determination that 
a settlement-only class was not ascertainable. In reconciling the Third Circuit’s heightened 
                                                 
81 See, e.g., Krimes v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. CV 15-5087, 2017 WL 2262998, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2017) 
(records of debit cards issued by defendant); Harlan v. Transworld Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A. 13-5882, 2015 WL 
505400, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2015) (records of recipients of debt collection letters); In re Processed Egg Prod. 
Antitrust Litig., 302 F.R.D. 339, 348 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (records of defendants’ sales of egg products). 
82 Silvis v. Ambit Energy L.P., 326 F.R.D. 419, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2018). See also Lizondro-Garcia v. Kefi LLC, 300 
F.R.D. 169, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (certifying a class of employees claiming unpaid overtime wages because 
“defendants’ payroll records will likely contain the names, titles, pay rates and dates of employment of the . . . class 
members”). 
83 See, e.g., Lucas v. Vee Pak, Inc., No. 12-CV-09672, 2017 WL 6733688, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2017) (finding 
that a class defined as African-Americans who sought a work assignment but did not receive one was ascertainable); 
Gehrich v. Chase Bank USA, 316 F.R.D. 215, 226–27 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (finding that a class defined as the recipients 
of calls or texts from the defendant was ascertainable). 
84 Wright v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. 14 C 10457, 2016 WL 4505169, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2016). 
Compare id. (believing the plaintiff’s “allegations” that the defendant’s database recorded the date, time, and 
recipient of every phone call placed by the defendant’s automated system, instead of thoroughly discussing the 
adequacy of the defendant’s records) with Haight v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., No. 613CV1400ORL28KRS, 2015 WL 
12830482, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2015) (rejecting the certification of a Telephone Consumer Protection Act class 
whose settlement agreement did not define the word “received” in the context of phone call recipients because 
identifying class members would take “subsequent satellite litigation”). 
 17 
ascertainability standard with Sullivan’s holding that manageability need not be analyzed in 
settlement-only classes, a panel of Judge Krause, Judge Scirica—who authored both Prudential 
and Carrera, as well as a concurrence to Sullivan—and Judge Fuentes—whose City Select 
concurrence pushed for the Third Circuit to adopt weak ascertainability—held in Comcast that 
the proposed settlement-only class was ascertainable “because the settlement agreement removes 
the need for a trial.”85 
In Comcast, the named plaintiff and Comcast established in their settlement agreement a 
mechanism for identifying members of a class of both former and current Comcast subscribers 
who rented set-top boxes.86 Although Comcast possessed records of current subscribers, its 
records of former subscribers were incomplete.87 Thus, to identify former subscribers, the 
settlement agreement called for combining self-identifying affidavits with “additional 
documentation” ranging from credit card statements to police reports.88 The district court held 
that it was “implausible” that the proposed documentation “would ever demonstrate that an 
individual subscribed to Premium Cable from Comcast and rented a Set-Top Box.” 89 Further, 
the court reasoned that relying on inconclusive evidence to prove class membership would 
violate Comcast’s due process right to challenge the evidence before the court that purports to 
identify class members.90 Thus, without reliable documentation, the class was not ascertainable 
because former Comcast subscribers would need to rely on “affidavits alone, without any 
objective records” to prove class membership, which was not administratively feasible.91 
                                                 
85 In re Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig., 656 F. App’x 8, 9 (3d Cir. 2016). 
86 In re Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 145, 152 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
87 Id. at 147. Comcast only possessed records since 2011 for former subscribers, but the class period ran from 2005 
until the court’s preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. 





The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. In a three-sentence order, the court first 
determined that Comcast’s inability to “test the reliability of the evidence submitted to prove 
class membership” was not at issue because, in the settlement agreement, “the defendant has 
agreed that the evidence regarding class membership is sufficiently reliable.”92 Thus, policy 
concerns about defendants’ due process rights were not at stake because the mechanism put forth 
to identify class members was approved, in a settlement agreement, by the defendant. 
Second, the court found that “the concern that ‘[t]he method of determining whether 
someone is in the class . . . be administratively feasible’ . . . is not implicated by this case, 
because the settlement agreement removes the need for a trial.”93 To support this proposition, the 
court cited to Judge Scirica’s Sullivan concurrence, which stated that “the settlement class 
presents no management problems because the case will not be tried.”94 Thus, the Comcast court 
determined that there was no administrative feasibility requirement for the proposed class 
because it was a settlement-only class, and settlement-only classes do not need to be tried. Just 
like in Sullivan, which concluded that “variations [in state laws] are irrelevant to certification of 
a settlement class,”95 the variations between current and former subscribers were irrelevant to the 
certification of Comcast’s settlement-only class. Therefore, there was no need, from both a 
manageability and ascertainability perspective, to identify all class members at the certification 
stage.96 
                                                 
92 In re Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig., 656 F. App’x 8, 8 (3d Cir. 2016). 
93 Id. at 9 (citing Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
94 Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 335 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J. concurring). Page 335 of Judge 
Scirica’s concurrence makes two main points: first, that the court’s focus should be on the defendant’s conduct when 
determining whether a proposed class has satisfied Rule 23(a) commonality. This is not wholly relevant to 
identifying members of the Comcast settlement-only class. Thus, I have concluded that the court is citing to Judge 
Scricia’s second point, about manageability, as discussed above. 
95 Id. at 304. 
96 Interestingly, on remand, the district court did not discuss ascertainability at all. Instead, in a footnote, the district 
court wrote that although “ascertainability is typically a ‘necessary prerequisite’ of a Rule 23(b)(3) class,” “in this 
case, however, the Third Circuit has concluded that ascertainability is not a proper basis to deny certification.” In re 
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III. Drawing from Comcast, Mullins, and Sullivan to circumvent the heightened 
ascertainability standard in the settlement-only context 
 As demonstrated by Comcast’s district court decision, the certification of settlement-only 
classes is jeopardized by heightened ascertainability. Although Comcast is the only Third Circuit 
case to have reversed a district court’s ascertainability determination in the settlement-only 
context, and the Comcast order is not precedential, Comcast nonetheless offers a blueprint for 
counsel attempting to avoid applying heightened ascertainability to settlement-only classes. I 
propose two pathways for doing so. First, I use Sullivan and Mullins to demonstrate how the 
Third Circuit could apply a weak ascertainability standard to settlement-only classes. Second, I 
propose that settlement agreements between the parties, in and of themselves, can serve as 
substitutes for ascertainability inquiries by mitigating key policy concerns. 
 
a. Using case law to read ascertainability into manageability 
Comcast stands for the proposition that administrative feasibility inquiries are 
unnecessary in the settlement-only context: because settlement-only classes will not go to trial, 
the court need not estimate “the likely difficulties in managing a class action” by “determining 
whether someone is in the class [through an] administratively feasible . . . method.”97 The 
Comcast decision therefore reads administrative feasibility into Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability 
inquiries. In Comcast, the Third Circuit suggests that, because Rule 23(b)(3)(D) applies only to 
litigation classes, as established in Sullivan, and because both Rule 23(b)(3)(D) and 
ascertainability seek to achieve the same core goal of identifying potential class members, the 
                                                 
Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig., No. CV 09-MD-2034, 2018 WL 4252463, at *7n.11 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2018). 
97 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D); Comcast, 656 F. App’x at 8. 
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Third Circuit should do away with the administrative feasibility requirement when certifying 
proposed settlement-only classes. Put another way, because Sullivan dictates that courts need not 
conduct a manageability inquiry when certifying settlement-only classes, reading administrative 
feasibility into manageability means that courts will not need to apply heightened ascertainability 
to settlement-only classes. 
Comcast’s citation to Judge Scirica’s Sullivan concurrence is interesting for two reasons.  
First, the concept of ascertainability did not exist when the court decided Sullivan: Marcus, the 
first case to apply ascertainability to a proposed class in the Third Circuit, was decided one year 
after Sullivan. Second, in Comcast, whether the class was ascertainable or not did not turn on 
differences in state law among class members’ claims, but instead on differences between current 
subscribers, about whom Comcast possessed records, and former subscribers, for whom there 
were incomplete records. Thus, it is not immediately obvious why the Comcast court cited to 
Sullivan. But despite the differences between Sullivan’s variations in state law and Comcast’s 
variations in subscribers, Sullivan’s language about “litigating colorable claims” parallels 
language about “mini-trials” used by the Third Circuit in refining its ascertainability standard. 
The Third Circuit wrote in Sullivan that “litigating whether a claim is ‘colorable’ and defending 
who is in and who is not in the class would be an endless process, preventing the parties from 
seriously getting to, and engaging in, settlement negotiations. . . . [T]he ‘individualized’ nature of 
the task would doom the class certification process from the outset.”98 Under Sullivan, then, and 
in the interest of judicial economy, there is no need for proof on the merits of whether every 
individual class member belongs in a settlement-only class. This mirrors the Third Circuit’s 
language about ascertainability throughout the Marcus line of cases—that, at the certification 
                                                 
98 Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 311. 
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phase, “a trial court should ensure that class members can be identified without extensive and 
individualized fact-finding or ‘mini-trials.’”99 This parallel language reflects the near-identical 
nature of the ascertainability and manageability inquiries, and the identical goals each inquiry 
seeks to achieve. 
Additionally, Mullins explicitly read administrative feasibility into manageability, by 
determining that ascertainability “is better addressed by the explicit requirements of Rule 
23(b)(3),” as well as the district courts’ “discretion to press the plaintiff for details about the 
plaintiff’s plan to identify class members . . . if the proposed class presents unusually difficult 
management problems.””100 According to Mullins, Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability inquiries are 
sufficient to “eliminate[] serious administrative burdens that are incongruous with the 
efficiencies expected in a class action” without a separate ascertainability inquiry. 101 Thus, the 
Mullins court believed that Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability encompasses administrative 
feasibility because, at their core, both inquiries seek to solve the same problem: identifying class 
members. In other words, because the Seventh Circuit already viewed identifying class members 
as part of its manageability inquiry, by the time Mullins appeared on its docket, there was no 
need for heightened ascertainability. 
The biggest hurdle to reading administrative feasibility into manageability in the Third 
Circuit is Byrd, which stressed that ascertainability inquiries are conducted independently from 
and prior to Rule 23 analyses.102 However, notably, some Third Circuit opinions have suggested 
                                                 
99 Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013). 
100 Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D)) (“[Rule 
23(b)(3)] requires that the class device be ‘superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 
the controversy.’ One relevant factor is ‘the likely difficulties in managing a class action.’”). 
101 Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012). 
102 Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The source of, or basis for, the ascertainability 
requirement as to a Rule 23(b)(3) class is grounded in the nature of the class-action device itself . . . the independent 
ascertainability inquiry ensures that a proposed class will actually function as a class.”). 
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reading administrative feasibility into manageability despite Byrd. Before Byrd was decided, for 
example, Marcus stated that “ascertainability problems spill over into the [Rule 23(b)(3)] 
predominance inquiry,”103 and Carrera stated that “administrative feasibility means that 
identifying class members is a manageable process that does not require much, if any, individual 
factual inquiry.”104 
Further, Judge Rendell’s Byrd concurrence acknowledged the similarities between 
ascertainability and manageability, stating that administrative feasibility “does nothing to ensure 
the manageability of a class or the ‘efficiencies’ of the class action mechanism.”105 Judge 
Fuentes’ City Select concurrence is even more direct. Citing to Mullins, Judge Fuentes argued 
that “imposing a separate manageability requirement within ascertainability ‘renders 
the manageability criterion of the superiority requirement superfluous,’”106 and that the 
ascertainability requirement “understates the ability of district courts to manage their cases.”107 
In addition, other district-level Third Circuit cases since Byrd have read ascertainability 
into manageability, though not in the settlement-only context.108 For example, in Vista 
Healthplan, a district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the named plaintiff’s 
motion for reconsideration after the plaintiff “argu[ed] that [Judge Goldberg] made clear errors 
of fact and law by conflating ascertainability with predominance.”109 In particular, the plaintiff 
                                                 
103 Id. at 594 n.3 (emphasis added). 
104 Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307–308 (citing 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:3 (5th ed. 2011)) (emphasis added). 
105 Byrd, 784 F.3d at 175 (Rendell, J., concurring). 
106 City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 447 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Mullins v. 
Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
107 Id. at 448. 
108 Alternatively, Judge Pratter has consistently read ascertainability into Rule 23(a). See Harlan v. Transworld 
Systems, Inc., No. CIV.A. 13–5882, 2015 WL 505400, at *3 n.4, *12 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2015) (grouping 
ascertainability together with an analysis of Rule 23(a)’s requirements); In re Processed Egg Prod. Antitrust Litig., 
302 F.R.D. 339, 347 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“First, under Rule 23(a), the Court determines that the Class Members are 
ascertainable.”). 
109 Vista Healthplan, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-1833, 2015 WL 4737288, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2015). 
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took issue with Judge Goldberg’s statement that “many individualized questions must be 
answered in order to determine whether an individual falls within the class definition.”110 
However, Judge Goldberg maintained that “it is clear from [Byrd and Carrera] that in assessing 
whether a proposed ascertainability methodology is administratively feasible, the court may also 
consider the extent of individualized inquiry.”111 Thus, Judge Goldberg read ascertainability into 
manageability, and held that the proposed class was not ascertainable because “the problems 
identified with respect to ascertainability . . . would clearly cause problems with case 
management.”112 
Similarly, in Mladenov, a district court in the District of New Jersey determined that a 
proposed litigation class—comprised of grocery shoppers who purchased bakery products 
labeled as “fresh” when they were in fact frozen—was not ascertainable.113 Identifying the 
customers, the court found, “would require the exact type of ascertainability complication 
that Carrera warns against, namely requiring mini-trials to determine who belongs in the class,” 
which would result in “enormous difficulties in managing these class actions.”114 The Mladenov 
court thus deemed the class not ascertainable because of the manageability issues it would 
present. 
Therefore, the Third Circuit has the tools at its disposal to read administrative feasibility 
into manageability in the settlement-only context. Counsel could cite to Comcast, Sullivan, 
Mullins, and the Byrd and City Select concurrences—as well as language from Marcus and 
Carrera—to arrive at a weak ascertainability standard for settlement-only classes. By reading 
                                                 
110 Id. at *12. 
111 Id. at *2. 
112 Id. at *5. 
113 Mladenov v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., 308 F.R.D. 127, 132 (D.N.J. 2015).  
114 Id. 
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administrative feasibility into manageability, and because Sullivan removes the need for 
manageability inquiries for settlement-only classes, the Third Circuit ascertainability inquiry for 
settlement-only classes should not require an analysis into the proposed class’s administrative 
feasibility. 
 
b. Using settlement agreements to overcome heightened ascertainability’s policy concerns 
In Comcast, the “evidence [the parties] submitted to prove class membership” in their 
settlement agreement was “sufficiently reliable” because the defendant agreed to the terms of the 
settlement agreement.115 This suggests that settlement agreements mitigate concerns over 
defendants’ due process rights, as well as concerns over excessive administrative burdens. 
Perhaps, then, settlement agreements could act as substitutes for administrative feasibility 
inquiries, as long as parties define the proposed class with reference to objective criteria and 
agree on a mechanism for identifying class members in the settlement agreement. In other words, 
through settlement agreements, parties can eliminate two of the policy concerns associated with 
heightened ascertainability and administrative feasibility. First, because the parties will have 
agreed on how to carry out and pay for a mechanism for identifying class members, the parties 
will have mitigated concerns over imposing excessive administrative burdens on both the parties 
and the court to identify class members. Second, the parties will have eliminated concerns over 
the defendants’ due process right to challenge the evidence before the court because the 
defendant will have agreed to the adequacy of the evidence used to identify class members in the 
settlement agreement. 
                                                 
115 In re Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig., 656 F. App’x 8, 8–9 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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In circuits with heightened ascertainability standards, district courts have held proposed 
classes to be ascertainable because of the existence of a settlement agreement. 116 For example, in 
Gregory, a court in the District of New Jersey determined that the proposed class was 
ascertainable because the settlement agreement defined the class using “objective, narrow 
criteria.”117 The court also noted that, in developing the settlement agreement, the parties worked 
together to find helpful identifying records, estimate the number of class members, and revise the 
initial proposed class definition.118 Additionally, the court pointed to the fact that the 
“[d]efendant neither disputes the class definition nor the scope of proposed class claims.”119 The 
proposed class was thus ascertainable due to the settlement agreement between the parties. 
Although reading ascertainability into settlement agreements would protect the due 
process rights of defendants and alleviate worries over administrative burdens, it would not take 
care of the third policy concern discussed in the Marcus line of cases: protecting unnamed class 
members, whose recovery could be diluted by fraudulent class members. But language from 
Carrera suggests otherwise, and indicates that Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy of representation 
requirement could assuage concerns over fraudulent class members. Carrera states that “if 
fraudulent or inaccurate claims materially reduce true class members’ relief, these class members 
could argue the named plaintiff did not adequately represent them because he proceeded with the 
understanding that absent members may get less than full relief.”120 Thus, a collateral Rule 
                                                 
116 See also In re Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-00103, 2016 WL 8200511 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 2016) 
(“The Settlement Agreements spell out class membership in terms of the precise years involved, geographical 
limitations, and the type of purchase for each part . . . [a]lthough the identification process will necessitate additional 
review, the Court will not have to resort to mini trials to determine membership.”); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. 
Litig., 226 F.R.D. 186, 195–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Essentially, the Issuers have solved the problem of ascertaining 
which class members may have known of the alleged scheme by agreeing to concede the issue.”). 
117 Gregory v. McCabe, No. CIV. 13-6962 AMD, 2014 WL 2615534, at *4 (D.N.J. June 12, 2014). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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23(a)(4) review could protect unnamed class members from being inadequately represented 
during settlement negotiations and in the ultimate settlement agreement. 
The Mullins court also determined that diluted recovery rarely, if ever, occurs, finding 
“no empirical evidence that the risk of dilution caused by inaccurate or fraudulent claims in the 
typical low-value consumer class action is significant.”121 Even if there were a risk, the Mullins 
court noted the infrequency with which eligible claimants actually submit claims for 
compensation in consumer class actions, making the danger of dilution “not so great that it 
justifies denying class certification altogether.”122 Further, courts have historically had many 
tools at their disposal to combat fraudulent claims, including claims administrators, auditors, and 
random sampling.123 The Mullins court therefore viewed the protection of unnamed class 
members as an issue outside the purview of a district judge’s administrative feasibility inquiry. 
Instead, dilution was merely a “claim administration issue[].”124 
Thus, a thorough claims administration process, coupled with the minimal administrative 
burdens and the due process protections offered by settlement agreements, could eliminate the 
need for an administrative feasibility requirement for settlement-only classes. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper, I proposed two ways for the Third Circuit to justify applying weak 
ascertainability to settlement-only classes. The two proposals would be most effective if 
presented together: the first proposal would draw from the precedent case law to read 
ascertainability into manageability, and the second proposal would draw upon settlement 
                                                 





agreements between parties to assure courts that key ascertainability policy concerns are being 
considered. 
The time is ripe for the Third Circuit to apply weak ascertainability to settlement-only 
classes. The Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard is only seven years old and, in 
its youth, faces both inconsistency in its application and instability in its future direction. 
Because the Third Circuit has historically certified settlement-only classes with more leniency, 
incentivizing parties to create settlement agreements for purposes of judicial efficiency and 
global peace, the Third Circuit should adopt a weak ascertainability standard for settlement-only 
classes. And the stage is set: with at least three judges pushing for a weak ascertainability 
standard, and with an established overlap between ascertainability and manageability, settlement-
only classes represent fertile ground for the Third Circuit to take the first steps in removing its 
administrative feasibility requirement. 
